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COMMENT
How to Raise Money: State Question 640, Revenue Bills,
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
I. Introduction
A series of Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions in 2017 have
significantly altered the treatment of tax legislation in Oklahoma. These
cases involved challenges to various legislative enactments designed to
close the budget shortfall in the last few days of the 2017 Regular Session.
The resulting decisions clarified the definition of “revenue bill” under the
Oklahoma Constitution and will provide up-to-date guidelines for the
legislature when drafting future revenue-raising measures.
Keeping the revenue bill restrictions of State Question 640 and these
recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions in mind, this Comment seeks to
explain what the Oklahoma legislature should consider when authoring
legislation that affects revenue. In Part II, this Comment provides a brief
background of the events leading up to the 2017 Oklahoma Supreme Court
cases. Part III discusses the most important cases regarding revenue bills in
Oklahoma’s Supreme Court history and how they have affected legislative
drafting before and after State Question 640. Part IV analyzes the 2017
Oklahoma Supreme Court rulings that will, going forward, serve as guides
for drafting revenue-raising legislation. Part V discusses how these cases
serve as guides and what their respective rulings mean for the future of
Oklahoma revenue bills. Finally, Part VI concludes these issues.
II. Background
Since its enactment in 1907, article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma
Constitution1 has prohibited revenue-raising bills “from originating in the
Senate and prohibited their enactment within the last five days of the
legislative session.”2 While application of article V, section 33 has been
consistent throughout Oklahoma’s history, an increasingly narrow
definition of “revenue bill” emerged, accompanied by a number of potential
exceptions.3 In the past century, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has

1. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33.
2. Mark H. Ramsey, What Is a Revenue Bill Within the Meaning of Our Most Recent
Constitutional Amendment, 63 OKLA. B.J. 1567, 1568 (1992).
3. Id.
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considered several of these exceptions.4 Some exceptions have been altered
or added by a 1992 vote by the people that made raising revenue in
Oklahoma extremely onerous: State Question 640.5
Twenty-five years ago, the people of Oklahoma voted to amend the
Oklahoma Constitution via State Question 640, which further restricted the
ability of the state legislature to pass revenue-raising measures.6 State
Question 640, proudly supported by the mantra “No New Taxes Without A
Vote Of The People,” was designed to greatly increase the constitutional
requirements for the Oklahoma legislature to pass revenue bills.7 State
Question 640 accomplished this goal by amending the minimum vote
requirement under article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution to
require a simple majority of the people or a three-fourths supermajority in
both Houses to pass revenue bills.8 Only Oklahoma, Michigan, and
Arkansas require such a stringent supermajority to pass revenue bills.9 Over
the years, Oklahoma has felt the effects of this significant revenue-raising
barrier, and many very important state functions have suffered.10 On the
other hand, revenue reductions, such as tax cuts, face little trouble making it
through the legislature, leading to even lower budgets for state functions
such as public schools, mental health clinics, and veteran affairs.11 In short,
it is relatively easy to pass bills that decrease revenue, but extremely
difficult to pass legislation that increases it. All these budget issues finally
4. See, e.g., Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d
571; Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152; Naifeh v. State ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759.
5. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348 (as proposed by Okla. Sec'y of
State, Oct. 30, 1991), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/640.pdf.
6. Id.; see also Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d 1113, 1116.
7. Fent, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117.
8. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5; OKLA. CONST. art.
V, § 33 (C)-(D).
9. ARK. BUREAU OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, REP. NO. 05-101, A SUMMARY OF
LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS 2 (2005) (noting that, although both Michigan
and Arkansas have the same requirement as Oklahoma, the Michigan constitutional
restriction only applies to state property taxes); see also Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 13 nn.18-21, 400 P.3d 759, 764 nn.18-21.
10. See Gene Perry, However You Count It, Oklahoma’s Per Pupil Education Funding
Is Way Down, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://okpolicy.org/however-countoklahomas-per-pupil-education-funding-way/.
11. Id. (“[T]he total cost of Oklahoma’s cuts to the top income tax rate since 2004 has
reached $1.022 billion per year.”); see also David Blatt, Proposed Budget Leaves Oklahoma
Services Massively Underfunded, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 25, 2017), https://okpolicy.org/
proposed-budget-leaves-oklahoma-services-massively-underfunded/.
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came to a head with the 2017 Regular Session for the Oklahoma legislature,
during which “months of wrangling and stalled negotiations” led to delays
for several bills designed to increase revenue for the state budget.12
The Oklahoma legislature began its 2017 Regular Session with the
constitutional requirement to balance13 an approximately $800 million
budget deficit.14 This deficit equates to a staggering inflation-adjusted $1.25
billion drop in the state budget compared to 2009.15 In an attempt to avoid
“draconian cuts to [Oklahoma’s] core services,” the House and Senate
proposed a number of last-minute bills designed to generate revenue to fill
the budget hole.16 The state legislature, aware of the requirements imposed
by State Question 640, appears to have simply hoped for the best in
enacting many of these last-minute bills that did not reach supermajority
support.17 This may have been due to a lack of clarity in what renders a bill
a revenue bill under State Question 640 and Oklahoma Supreme Court
precedent, but it could also have been due to panic in the Oklahoma
legislature.
No matter the underlying cause of the state of emergency that
necessitated the 2017 Special Session, recent Oklahoma Supreme Court
decisions have created a roadmap for the Oklahoma legislature to follow
when enacting revenue-raising legislation.18 Some of the revenue-raising
legislation was challenged and addressed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
12. Blatt, supra note 11.
13. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 23.
14. Blatt, supra note 11. Governor Mary Fallin and the Oklahoma legislature had a
severe budget crisis on their hands that was directly affecting education, health care, and
several other important industries. See Associated Press, Oklahoma Faces $878 Million
Shortfall for Upcoming Year, Revenue Failure Declared, KFOR (Feb. 21, 2017, 11:11 AM),
https://kfor.com/2017/02/21/oklahoma-faces-878-million-shortfall-for-upcoming-yearrevenue-failure-declared/.
15. Blatt, supra note 11.
16. Governor Mary Fallin, Press Release: Gov. Fallin Statement on 2018 Fiscal Year
Budget Agreement, OK.GOV (May 24, 2017), http://services.ok.gov/triton/modules/
newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=223&article_id=32877; see also Blatt, supra note 11.
Oklahoma’s revenues have been on a steep decline for years, and 2018 (and beyond, if the
trend continues) will be no exception, despite all the bills that either have not been
challenged or have already been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Blatt, supra note 11.
While the projected revenue for 2018 was slightly higher than 2017, agencies will still get
budget cuts, just as they have for the five preceding years. Id.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d
571; Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152; Naifeh v. State ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759.
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in 2017, starting with Naifeh v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
which involved a challenge to Senate Bill 845.19 Senate Bill 845, known as
the “Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act of 2017,” created a smoking
cessation fee of $1.50 per pack of cigarettes.20 Despite language in the text
of the bill suggesting that its primary purpose was to benefit the public
health,21 the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down Senate Bill 845 under
article V, section 33 as an improperly enacted revenue bill.22 The loss of
this bill single-handedly caused “$215 million in appropriated funds for
fiscal year 2018” to evaporate, exacerbating the revenue shortfall.23
After Naifeh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Oklahoma
Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, a case involving the constitutionality of
House Bill 2433.24 In upholding House Bill 2433, which partially removed
a sales tax exemption that was given to automobile sales in 1935,25 the
court ruled that although the bill did not satisfy the requirements of article
V, section 33, House Bill 2433 did not constitute a revenue bill within the
meaning of the Constitution.26 Thus, the court did not strike down the bill as
unconstitutional.27 This legislation is expected to generate $123 million in
2018.28
The third case, Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
brought a challenge to House Bill 1449.29 Congress drafted House Bill 1449
to modify the “Motor Fuels Tax” to set new registration fees for hybrid and
fully electric vehicles.30 According to the author of House Bill 1449, the bill
was intended “to replace lost motor fuel tax revenue that's used for road and
bridge repairs” such that electric and hybrid car owners pay their fair share

19. Naifeh, ¶ 7, 400 P.3d at 762-63.
20. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
21. See infra Section IV.A (explaining that merely drafting a regulatory purpose for
revenue-raising legislation is not enough: the legislation must effectuate that purpose
through the use of the raised funds).
22. Naifeh, ¶ 51, 400 P.3d at 775.
23. OKLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 56TH SESS., 2017 SESSION IN REVIEW 43 (2017),
https://www.okhouse.gov/Documents/SIR%202017%20web.pdf [hereinafter OKLA. HOUSE,
2017 SESSION IN REVIEW].
24. Okla. Auto. Dealers, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153HB.
25. Id. ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153-54 (citing H.R. 2433, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017)).
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. OKLA. HOUSE, 2017 SESSION IN REVIEW, supra note 23.
29. 2017 OK 83, ¶ 1, 405 P.3d 691, 694.
30. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
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for general road upkeep.31 The court held that the bill was a revenue bill and
struck the law down as unconstitutional.32
Finally, Richardson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission was a
challenge to several bills.33 While House Bills 2433 and 1449 were already
decided in the previous cases, the petitioner challenged House Bill 2348 for
the first time.34 The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied their jurisdiction over
the case and so did not reach the issue of House Bill 2348 because, at the
time of the decision, it was not possible to know “whether the law would
increase revenue.”35
III. The History of Oklahoma Revenue Legislation in the Supreme Court
For well over a century, article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma
Constitution has produced significant litigation over its interpretation. As
discussed below, the Oklahoma Supreme Court created a two-pronged test
to determine whether legislation is revenue legislation within the meaning
of article V, section 33. This test has changed considerably over time.
A. Article V, Section 33 and the Anderson Test
The original two requirements for a revenue bill to become a law are still
in place today. First, a revenue bill must “originate in the House,” rather
than the Senate.36 Second, the bill must not “be passed during the last five
days of the [legislative] session.”37 Article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma
Constitution did not originally contain the supermajority clause it does now.
The first case to establish guidelines for revenue bills in Oklahoma was
Anderson v. Ritterbusch, decided just one year after the formation of
Oklahoma as a state.38 Anderson, the petitioner in the case, appealed the
assessment of taxes on his property stemming from a newly enacted senate
bill.39 Of his many arguments, the most pertinent to this Comment was his
challenge under article V, section 33 that the bill in question was an

31. Dale Denwalt, Proposed Oklahoma Fees on Hybrid, Electric Cars Would Generate
$1M Annually, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://newsok.com/article/5543560.
32. Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700.
33. 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 571.
34. See id. ¶ 1, 406 P.3d at 572.
35. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573.
36. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33.
37. Id.
38. 1908 OK 250, 98 P. 1002.
39. See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 98 P. at 1004.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

502

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:497

unconstitutionally enacted revenue bill.40 Justice Kane, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, primarily discussed the history of the
origination clause in the U.S. Constitution and concluded that the bill in
question was not a revenue-raising bill within the meaning of the Oklahoma
Constitution.41 The origination clause was created by the British House of
Commons and adopted by the U.S. Constitution, and it mandates that
revenue legislation must start in the House of Representatives.42 Thereafter,
a majority of states adopted the same clause in their own constitutions,43
Oklahoma included. Justice Kane reasoned that, to properly rule on this
issue of first impression in Oklahoma, he needed to understand why the
clause was drafted in the first place. Borrowing language from Justice
Harlan of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Kane established the
two-pronged test that has been used throughout Oklahoma’s history. The
first prong defines revenue bills as “those that levy taxes in the strict sense
of the word,” and the second prong states that “the principal object is the
raising of revenue” and not “bills for other purposes which may incidentally
create revenue.”44 Justice Kane held that the bill in question did not satisfy
the second prong of this test because the primary purpose of the bill was to
prevent property owners from circumventing taxes, not to raise revenue.45
Since Anderson, this test has been used consistently in cases dealing with
revenue bills, including cases decided after the passing of State Question
640, albeit with some alterations.46 Moreover, the Anderson opinion
contained dicta stating that bills which “lower the rate of taxation of the
state” are also considered revenue bills within the meaning of the
Oklahoma Constitution.47 This assertion was eventually resolved by State
Question 640 in Fent v. Fallin discussed below.48
40. Id. ¶ 2, 98 P. at 1004.
41. Id. ¶¶ 15-18, 98 P. at 1007.
42. Id. ¶ 6, 98 P. at 1005 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 871, at 338 (1833)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
cl. 1.
43. Anderson, ¶ 8, 98 P. at 1006 (quoting STORY, supra note 42, § 875, at 342).
44. Id. ¶ 16, 98 P. at 1007 (quoting Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202
(1897)).
45. Id. ¶ 15, 98 P. at 1007.
46. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 8 n.21, 401 P.3d 1152, 1155
n.21; see also Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶¶ 17-20, 400 P.3d
759, 765-66.
47. Anderson, ¶ 14, 98 P. at 1006 (dictum).
48. 2014 OK 105, ¶¶ 7, 17–18, 345 P.3d 1113, 1115–16, 1118 (overruling dicta in
the Anderson opinion that suggested the definition of “raising revenue” might include bills
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B. Levying a Tax in the Strict Sense of the Word
The first Oklahoma Supreme Court case after the establishment of the
Anderson two-pronged test, which also dealt with the constitutional
treatment of the removal of a tax exemption, was Cornelius v. State ex rel.
Cruce.49 Cornelius, the “register of deeds of Oklahoma,” brought this suit
and demanded the state pay a newly-enacted tax owed for recording a
mortgage.50 This tax was created to remove an exemption in place for
mortgages by “deem[ing] [them] to be real property, and . . . assess[ing]
and tax[ing]” them as such under the challenged act.51 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in another unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas,
did not strike down the act under article V, section 33 and held that a bill
“merely declar[ing] that certain property theretofore exempt from taxation
shall thereafter be subject to taxation” is not a revenue measure within the
meaning of the Constitution because it does not levy a tax in the strict sense
of the word52 and, therefore, fails the first prong of the test.53 Just as the
court in Anderson studied the history of revenue bills to reach its decision,
Justice Turner looked to decisions in other states to come to his
conclusion.54
Just one year later, Justice Hardy revisited the treatment of tax
exemptions under article V, section 33 and reaffirmed Cornelius for the
same reasons.55 This holding has been questioned throughout Oklahoma’s
history, including after State Question 640, but the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has not wavered.56 Thereafter, the next challenge to legislation which
removed a tax exemption came to the Oklahoma Supreme Court nearly half
a century later.57 In 1956, the court upheld Cornelius in Leveridge v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission by ruling that a bill removing an exemption
from a registration fee for used cars failed the first prong of the test because

resulting in a decrease of revenue (citing Perry Cty. v. Selma Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (Ala.
1877)).
49. 1914 OK 222, 140 P. 1187.
50. Id. ¶ 1, 140 P. at 1188.
51. Id. ¶ 9, 140 P. at 1188.
52. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 140 P. at 1188 (quoting Mumford v. Sewall, 4 P. 585 (Or. 1883)).
53. Id. ¶ 11, 140 P. at 1188.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See Trs.’, Ex’rs’ & Sec. Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 1915 OK 1059, ¶¶ 25-26, 158 P. 293,
298.
56. See, e.g., Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 26, 401 P.3d 1152,
1162.
57. See Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, 294 P.2d 809.
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“[t]he bill under consideration d[id] not within its four corners levy a tax.”58
Leveridge, the most recent case to examine bills that remove a tax
exemption under article V, section 33 before the 2017 cases, received heavy
scrutiny in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, discussed below,
with four justices arguing that it should be overruled in light of State
Question 640.59
C. The Principal Object of Raising Revenue
The second prong in the Anderson test has gone through even more
significant changes in interpretation than the first prong. The first decision,
based primarily on the second prong, occurred in In re Lee, in which the
plaintiff challenged a law establishing the $25 docket fee then charged “in
each case filed in the Supreme Court.”60 One basis of the challenge to the
enacted law was that it was a revenue bill that originated in the Senate and
was therefore unconstitutional under article V, section 33.61 Relying on
Cornelius and the test laid out in Anderson, the court upheld the law
because “it prescribes a fee to the public for services rendered by their
officers, and is not exacted for revenue, but as compensation.”62
Effectively, this law failed the second prong of the revenue bill test because
it generated revenue “incidentally.”63
The following year, the Supreme Court upheld another law for the same
reason in Lusk v. Ryan.64 The law in question in Lusk provided first that a
revenue officer must hold alleged illegal and excessive taxes for thirty days
after the taxpayer gives the officer notice that the taxpayer believes that the
taxes are illegal. Second, the law provided that the revenue officer must pay
back any amount deemed by a court to be excessive and illegal.65 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the enacted law was not a revenue bill
because it “simply provide[d] a procedure to recover illegal taxes paid.”66
This was not “a bill for the raising of revenue” within the meaning of article
V, section 33 because the bill was not intended to raise any revenue.67
58. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 294 P. at 811-12 (citing Cornelius, 1914 OK 222, 140 P. 1187).
59. See Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 7-11, 401 P.3d at 1168 (Watt, J., dissenting).
60. In re Lee, 1917 OK 458, ¶ 1, 168 P. 53, 54, superseded by statute on other grounds,
20 OKLA. STAT. § 15 (2011).
61. Id. ¶ 32, 168 P. at 57.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. 1918 OK 94, ¶ 3, 171 P. 323, 324.
65. Id. ¶ 2, 171 P. at 324.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Although the bill specifically targeted taxes, it did not attempt to raise or
change them. It simply gave taxpayers a method to recover taxes collected
when a court ruled the taxes illegal.
The principal object prong was used, yet again, to uphold a law called
the Motor Vehicle Act, which provided a “license fee to be paid by
operators” of commercial motor vehicles using the Oklahoma state
highways for profit.68 In two similar cases challenging the enacted law, Ex
parte Sales and Ex parte Tindall, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that
the Motor Vehicle Act was not a revenue bill because the law “regulat[ed] a
growing effort, on the part of certain enterprises, to appropriate the public
highways to their own free use” and did not set out to raise revenue.69 Just
as in Lusk, the principal purpose of the enacted law was not to raise
revenue. The tax revenue was merely incidental to the true purpose of
maintaining the public highways.
In Tindall, the first of the two challenges, Petitioner A.L. Tindall was
arrested for not complying with the then-enacted Motor Vehicle Act.70
Tindall challenged the enacted law under numerous provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution, including article V, section 33.71 The following
case, Ex parte Sales, had facts, allegations, and defenses identical to
Tindall,72 but the court investigated article V, section 33 in more detail. The
Sales court noted that the Motor Vehicle Act, by requiring for-profit users
of the public highways to pay a fee, provided a method of supporting the
regulation and maintenance of the highways.73 Any revenue raised was
“merely incidental” to that purpose.74 Therefore, the court held that the
enacted law was not a revenue bill.75
As the court elaborated in more recent cases, the money raised went
directly to support the true purpose of the bill: supporting public
transportation on highways. In Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
the court dealt with a similar set of circumstances and upheld another law
requiring a license fee for certain vehicle operators, following Sales and
Tindall.76
68. Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK 668, ¶ 7, 233 P. 186, 187; see also Ex parte Tindall, 1924
OK 669, ¶ 4, 229 P. 125, 127.
69. Sales, ¶ 7, 233 P. at 187.
70. Tindall, ¶¶ 1-2, 229 P. at 127.
71. See id. ¶ 5, 229 P. at 127.
72. Sales, ¶ 2, 233 P. at 187.
73. Id. ¶ 7, 233 P. at 187.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 1936 OK 516, ¶ 10, 66 P.2d 1097, 1100 (citing Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125).
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D. State Question 640 and Fent v. Fallin
Throughout the many challenges to revenue legislation, the two-pronged
test has been reaffirmed time and time again.77 At the time of this
Comment, Oklahoma’s definition of “revenue bill” is well established.
However, in 1992, when the people of Oklahoma voted on State Question
640, there was a degree of uncertainty as to what constituted a revenue
bill.78 State Question 640, passed by a 56.2% majority of the people,79
added two provisions to article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma
Constitution.80 The first provision imposes a democratic vote requirement
for most revenue bills:
C. Any revenue bill originating in the House of Representatives
shall not become effective until it has been referred to the people
of the state at the next general election held throughout the state
and shall become effective and be in force when it has been
approved by a majority of the votes cast on the measure at such
election and not otherwise, except as otherwise provided in
subsection D of this section.81
The second provision created an alternative way to enact revenue bills by
allowing a 75% supermajority of both the House and Senate.82 In effect,
State Question 640 requires a majority of the people or a 75%
supermajority of both houses of the legislature to enact revenue bills.
At the time of passage of State Question 640, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had only ruled on article V, section 33 challenges to legislation that
increased taxes, but not legislation that decreased them.83 The court faced
such a challenge in Fent v. Fallin in 2014.84 The bill at issue in Fent
contained provisions that would “reduce[] income taxes in some
77. See , e.g., Calvey v. Daxon, 2000 OK 17, ¶ 18, 997 P.2d 164, 171; Fent v. Okla.
Capitol Improvement Auth., 1999 OK 64, ¶ 12, 984 P.2d 200, 209; In re Initiative Petition
No. 348, State Question No. 640, 1991 OK 110, ¶ 3 n.3, 820 P.2d 772, 774 n.3 (citing Pure
Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK 516, 66 P.2d 1097); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Okla.
Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 1965 OK 111, ¶ 23, 405 P.2d 68, 73; Wallace v. Gassaway, 1931 OK
210, ¶¶ 18-19, 298 P. 867, 870.
78. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5.
79. State Question 640, What’s That?, OKLA. POL’Y INST., https://okpolicy.org/statequestion-640/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2018).
80. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 7, 345 P.3d 1113, 1116.
84. Id. ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18.
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circumstances” by modifying Oklahoma income tax rates.85 The attorney
Jerry Fent challenged that bill under article V, section 33 alleging that the
bill was an unconstitutionally enacted “revenue bill” under the Oklahoma
Constitution.86 At first glance, this case appeared to be an easy decision in
favor of the petitioner. The bill in question lowered income tax rates, and
such a bill was a “revenue bill” under the Anderson line of cases. Therefore,
Petitioner Fent argued that “whether legislation increases or decreases taxes
is irrelevant if the purpose of the legislation is to collect taxes.”87 While that
seemed to be the rule under Anderson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took a
different view after the people amended article V, section 33 of the
Oklahoma Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice Kauger held
instead that “the voters did not intend § 33 to apply to bills which decrease
state revenues” when they enacted State Question 640.88 Justice Kauger
focused very closely on what “the ordinary person who voted on the 1992
amendment” believed they were supporting.89 Referring to the news and
press at the time of the vote, she concluded that the people approved State
Question 640 because they wanted to “limit[] the Legislature's taxing
power” and “restrict[] tax hikes to bring accountability” to Oklahoma’s
government.90 While the Anderson court relied on state court and United
Kingdom precedent, Justice Kauger focused on “[t]he intent of the framers
and electorate in adopting” State Question 640.91 Justice Kauger concluded
that there was no suggestion that the amendment should apply to any laws
other than those which seek to raise revenue or “increase the tax burden.”92
Ultimately, it was clear to the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the
amendment changed the meaning of “revenue bill” within the Oklahoma
Constitution.93 Thus, in Fent, the Supreme Court officially resolved the
issue presented by the Anderson dicta94 regarding State Question 640: the
85. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 345 P.3d at 1114-15.
86. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 345 P.3d at 1115.
87. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7, 345 P.3d at 1115-16. This “secondary” holding in Anderson was, in fact,
dicta; however, it was still an important part of the opinion, and Fent provided the
opportunity to challenge it. See Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 8 n.21, 401 P.3d 1152, 1155 n.21 (noting that Fent overruled
Anderson dicta).
88. Fent, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d at 1116.
89. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117.
90. Id. ¶ 10, 345 P.3d at 1116.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18.
93. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117.
94. Id. ¶ 18, 345 P.3d at 1118.
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term “revenue bill” no longer includes bills that would decrease revenue
because such legislation does not have the principal purpose of raising
revenue.95
IV. The 2017 Supreme Court Rulings
Three years after Fent, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled on several
challenges brought against various newly enacted House and Senate bills.96
These cases, paired with Fent, form the general guidelines for the
Oklahoma legislature to follow when authoring revenue bills. With the
decisions laid down in these three cases, the justices explained how they
will treat different revenue-raising measures under State Question 640. The
first 2017 revenue bill case was Naifeh v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, challenging a new “fee” imposed on cigarette wholesalers.
The second was Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, challenging
a partial revocation of a tax exemption on the sale of vehicles. The third
was Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, challenging a
new “fee” placed on the purchase of hybrid and fully-electric vehicles. The
final case was Richardson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
challenging not only the tax exemption removal and fee for hybrid and
electric vehicles, but also the changes in the standard Oklahoma income tax
deduction.
A. Naifeh v. State
Naifeh involved a challenge to the newly enacted97 Senate Bill 845, the
“Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act of 2017,” which assessed a new
$1.50-per-pack fee on cigarette wholesalers.98 Justice Wyrick, writing for a
unanimous court, ruled that the legislation was a revenue bill within the
meaning of article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution because it
was a tax in the strict sense of the word and had the principal purpose of
increasing revenue, thereby satisfying both prongs of the Anderson test.99
95. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117.
96. See Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759; Okla.
Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152;
Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 571.
97. The legislators recognized that it was “a decision between bad or worse”: either they
do not balance the budget, or they enact legislation subject to a potentially successful
challenge under article V, section 33. Naifeh, ¶ 9, 400 P.3d at 763 (citing OKLA. CONST. art.
X, §§ 23, 25).
98. Id. ¶ 2, 400 P.3d at 761 (citing S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017)).
99. Id. ¶ 3, 400 P.3d at 761.
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After a backdrop of the history of revenue bills in Oklahoma, the court
began its discussion with the second prong of the Anderson test and
considered whether the legislation had the principal purpose of raising
revenue.100 One of the first and most pressing considerations was that the
amount of revenue resulting from the fee that would actually serve the
claimed purpose of the bill was insignificant compared to the expected
overall revenue from the legislation.101 As the title suggests, Senate Bill 845
purported to raise money to cease and prevent smoking throughout
Oklahoma.102 While the government argued that this bill is “regulatory in
nature,” the court disagreed: “only a tiny fraction (about 0.5%) of the
revenues are to be apportioned to a fund used for smoking-cessation
efforts” while the vast majority of the funds would be used for general state
healthcare purposes.103 As previously discussed, the budget for Oklahoma
was in dire straits, and Senate Bill 845 was expected to raise a significant
amount of money for the statemore than $250 million.104 The principal
issue facing the court was that the money raised from this bill did not really
have a specific purpose outside of the “tiny fraction” being used for the
legislation’s smoking cessation façade, which was only one million of the
expected $250 million.105 Senate Bill 845 represented the “single largest
source of new revenue for the State” and was crucial to offset Oklahoma’s
budget crisis.106 However, the revenue was not raised for a purpose
permissible for the bill to avoid the constitutional restrictions of article V,
section 33.107
In the text of the bill, the drafters attempted to show that the main
purpose was smoking prevention, but the bill did not actually require that
an amount be spent to that end.108 Instead, it appropriated everything except
$1 million to a “Heath Care Enhancement Fund” which was meant to
100. Id. ¶ 21, 400 P.3d at 766.
101. Id. ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767.
102. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
103. Naifeh, ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767.
104. S. 845 (Comm. Substitute), 56th Leg., 1st Sess., at 5 (Okla. 2017); The Oklahoman
Editorial Board, Legal Challenge to Oklahoma Tobacco “Fee” Is No Surprise, NEWSOK
(June 12, 2017 12:00AM), https://newsok.com/article/5552303/legal-challenge-tooklahoma-tobacco-fee-is-no-surprise (citing an official estimate of $257 million).
105. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Okla. 2017).
106. Naifeh, ¶ 33, 400 P.3d at 770.
107. Naifeh, ¶ 36-37, 400 P.3d at 770.
108. There are no specific mandated expenditures to be found anywhere in the text of the
bill. There are only certain required acts which generally discourage smoking in certain
places. See S. 845, 56th Leg. 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
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generally “enhanc[e] the health of Oklahomans.”109 Justice Wyrick’s
concern, at least in terms of article V, section 33, was that the bill “[did] not
provide more specific direction nor [did] it send any money” to any specific
government agency for the purpose of preventing smoking in Oklahoma. 110
Although the bill stated that “[t]he State Department of Health and the
Tobacco Settlement Endowment Trust shall work together” and “[t]he
Oklahoma State Department of Health and the Department of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Services shall work together” to attack
smoking-related issues in Oklahoma, it did not identify how, when, or with
what money these agencies would perform their respective duties. 111
Furthermore, Justice Wyrick held that the other “regulatory” provisions
written in the bill are nothing more than codifications of previously enacted
policies or are otherwise vague and ambiguous with little or no direction
given to the agencies tasked with implementing them.112
The court continued the principal purpose analysis with some
comparisons to relevant Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent.113 First,
Justice Wyrick dismissed the government’s contention that the revenue
from the $1.50-per-pack fee was incidental to the purpose of preventing
smoking in Oklahoma.114 While he agreed that in other circumstances it
could be the case, such as if the fee imposed by the law was instead a
penalty for a smoking-related violation, Justice Wyrick did not believe that
“a quarter-of-a-billion dollars per year” can really be said to be
“incidental.”115 The court agreed that this sort of fee was, for all intents and
purposes, a “sin tax” subject to the constraints of article V, section 33
because its main purpose is to raise revenue.116 Differentiating this “fee”
from the fee challenged in In re Lee, Justice Wyrick noted that in Lee “there
was a direct nexus between the fee and the government service being
provided to the payor of the fee,” e.g. the $25 filing fee for the Supreme

109. Id. at 4.
110. Naifeh, ¶ 26, 400 P.3d at 767.
111. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017). The bill provides specific issues that
these duos are supposed to research but does not give them any money with which to work.
Id.
112. Naifeh, ¶¶ 25-31, 400 P.3d at 767-68.
113. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771.
114. Id. ¶ 38, 400 P.3d at 770-71.
115. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 769-70 (“If the Legislature had chosen to reduce smoking by
making it illegal . . . with civil penalties . . . the revenue generated . . . might well be
incidental . . . .”).
116. Id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770.
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Court;117 whereas Justice Wyrick pointed out a very obvious difference
between the Lee filing fee and the cigarette “fee” in Naifeh: “the 1.50
assessment [was] actually assessed against the seller of cigarettes, whom no
one argues will make use of any government-provided health services.”118
According to the court, the past cases in which various fees were ruled to be
incidental to the purpose of the bills that created them were different from
the Naifeh smoking cessation fee because this fee “is ultimately aimed at
consumers rather than upon a [taxpayer] profiting from the use of state
services,” especially considering the vague and non-specific directives
drafted for the fee revenue.119 Thus, Justice Wyrick concluded that Senate
Bill 845 had passed the principal purpose prong of the Anderson test.120
Additionally, the court reaffirmed the holding in Fent v. Fallin by
“reiterat[ing] that whether a measure is ‘intended to raise revenue’ must be
the overarching consideration in determining whether a measure is a
‘revenue bill.’”121
The court next considered the first prong of the Anderson test—whether
the Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act “levie[d] a tax in the strict
sense” of the word.122 The ultimate question in Naifeh was whether the
“smoking cessation fee” was, in fact, “a fee or a tax.”123 While Justice
Wyrick agreed that the text of Senate Bill 845 itself suggested that the
$1.50 per pack was a fee because it was “assessed primarily” for regulatory
purposes, he noted that the nature of the cessation fee did not effectuate the
purpose as it was written in the legislation.124 There have been many
different cigarette fees that have been enacted in Oklahoma and all of them
have been “codified as excise taxes.”125 This $1.50-per-pack fee would have
been treated no differently than these other excise taxes.126 The revenue
from the fee would have been collected by the Oklahoma Tax Commission
and deposited in the State Treasury for use by the government for general

117. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771.
118. Id.
119. Id. ¶ 41, 400 P.3d at 772.
120. See id. ¶ 42, 400 P.3d at 772.
121. Id.
122. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 772.
123. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 773.
124. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 772-73 (quoting GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC v. Montgomery Cty.,
650 F.3d 1021, 1023 (4th Cir. 2011)).
125. Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 400 P.3d at 772-73 (citing several different Oklahoma bills and statutes
that tax cigarettes in different ways).
126. Id. ¶ 44, 400 P.3d at 773 & n.72.
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healthcare enhancements.127 None of those general healthcare
enhancements are directly related to smoking, the only exception being the
$1 million used for the express purposes of the bill.128 Justice Wyrick went
even further and pointed out that the “consumer who ultimately bears the
costs of the assessment is paying the retailer consideration in exchange for a
pack of cigarettes, rather than the government in exchange for healthcare
for his smoking-related illness.”129 His worry, if the court upheld Senate
Bill 845, was that a “quintessential excise tax [could] be transformed into a
fee merely by calling it a fee and adding some regulatory gloss” thereby
increasing the tax burden without a vote of the people or the supermajority
required by State Question 640.130 This would go directly against the “tax
relief” purpose of State Question 640 to require “all ‘future bills “intended
to raise revenue”’” to have a supermajority of the Legislature or a majority
of the people supporting it.131 The smoking cessation fee in question levied
a tax because it would increase the tax burden without conferring a specific
benefit to the taxpayer.132 Having satisfied both prongs of the Anderson test,
the court unanimously struck down Senate Bill 845 as an unconstitutionally
enacted revenue bill because the bill was approved within the final five
days of the legislative session, thereby violating article V, section 33 of the
Oklahoma Constitution.133
B. Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State
In Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, a trade association of car dealers
brought an unsuccessful challenge to the newly enacted revenue measure
House Bill 2433.134 House Bill 2433 removed 1.25% of the sales tax
exemption on automobile sales.135 In a fiercely divided court, the justices
upheld the law 5-4.136

127. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Okla. 2017).
128. Id.
129. Naifeh, ¶ 47, 400 P.3d at 774.
130. Id. ¶ 49, 400 P.3d at 774-75.
131. Id. (quoting Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 14, 345 P.3d 1113, 1117).
132. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771.
133. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 400 P.3d at 761.
134. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 0, 401
P.3d 1152, 1153.
135. H.R. 2433, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
136. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶¶ 25-26, 401 P.3d at 1162.
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1. The Majority Opinion
At the outset of the majority opinion written by Justice Wyrick, the court
ruled that the bill satisfied the primary purpose prong of the Anderson test:
it had the principal purpose of raising revenue.137 The court compared this
case to Leveridge, discussed above, because it was based on similar
circumstances.138 Like in Leveridge, the Oklahoma Automobile Dealers
court rejected the argument that the bills in question had any purpose other
than raising revenue.139 Hence, the court focused heavily on the first prong
of the Anderson test: whether House Bill 2433 levies a tax in the strict sense
of the word.140
In fact, the overarching consideration for the court in Oklahoma
Automobile Dealers was the 1956 holding in Leveridge. The House Bill in
question in Leveridge sought to amend a statute to remove a sales tax
exemption for the sale of used cars in Oklahoma.141 The Leveridge court
held that the law was not a revenue bill subject to the strictures of the
Oklahoma Constitution because it did not levy a tax, but “merely declare[d]
that certain property (automobiles of the latest manufactured models owned
by used car dealers) theretofore exempt from taxation . . . shall thereafter be
subject to taxation.”142 The Leveridge court, by following the holding in
Cornelius v. State, refused to subject bills that remove tax exemptions to the
constitutional restrictions of article V, section 33.143 And in Oklahoma
Automobile Dealers, the court opted to follow the Leveridge rule in spite of
State Question 640,144 a decision which the dissenting justices hotly
contested.145
In an attempt to distinguish Leveridge, the Petitioners in Oklahoma
Automobile Dealers argued that, unlike the law at issue in Leveridge, House
Bill 2433 was a revenue bill because “it cause[d] people to have to pay
more taxes.”146 House Bill 2433, providing revenue in the form of a
137. Id. ¶ 12, 401 P.3d at 1157.
138. Id. (citing Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, 294 P.2d 809).
139. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶¶ 11-13, 401 P.3d at 1156-57.
140. Id. ¶ 13, 401 P.3d at 1157; see also Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 1908 OK 250, ¶ 15, 98
P. 1002, 1007.
141. Leveridge, ¶ 7, 294 P.2d at 811.
142. Id. ¶ 13, 294 P.2d at 812.
143. Id.
144. See generally Okla. Auto. Dealers, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152.
145. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 401 P.3d at 1162; id. ¶¶ 1-13, 401 P.3d at 1162-66 (Combs, C.J.,
dissenting); id. ¶¶ 1-24, 401 P.3d at 1166-75 (Watt, J., dissenting).
146. Id. ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 1158.
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removal of sales tax exemptions, increases tax revenue in practice. But the
majority held that merely because a bill raises revenue does not mean the
bill “levies” a tax.147 In fact, “because the original levies of the sales tax on
automobile sales were subject” to the constitutional restrictions, this sales
tax has already successfully satisfied the purposes behind article V, section
33.148
The court also dismissed one of the most persuasive arguments in Fent v.
Fallin: State Question 640 did not affect the definition of “revenue bill”
such that it would encompass bills that remove exemptions from alreadylevied taxes.149 The court rejected the notion that State Question 640
changed the definition of revenue bill so drastically as to remove the
requirement that a bill levy a tax in the strict sense of the word.150
As a final justification for its holding, the court discussed the
constitutional policies supporting it.151 The majority read article V, section
33 in conjunction with two other constitutional provisions to conclude that
they “express an unmistakable constitutional policy disfavoring special
exemptions from taxation.”152 First, article X, section 5 provides that
“[t]axes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects.”153 The court
reasoned that, in order to allow the legislature to make taxes more uniform,
it would be contrary to the constitution to disallow the legislature from
removing special exemptions, especially if those exemptions would create
an unjust disparity.154 Second, article V, section 50 limits the legislature’s
power from enacting tax exemptions for “any property withis [sic] this
State.”155 The legislature can only enact exemptions that the constitution
specifically allows.156 The court further reasoned that, were they to rule
against the State, the voting requirement to enact special exemptions would
be a simple majority, but taking those same exemptions back would require
the article V, section 33 supermajority restriction.157 This would make it
even more difficult for the legislature to raise money for the State, which
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
§ 50.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 401 P.3d at 1159.
Id. ¶ 18, 401 P.3d at 1158.
Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1160-61.
Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1161; see also OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5); OKLA. CONST. art. 5,
OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5(B).
Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1160-61.
OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 50.
Id.
Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 24, 401 P.3d at 1161-62.
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the court decided would be at odds with the Oklahoma Constitution.158
Additionally, this difficulty would be contrary to the policy that “those
lacking . . . political clout” could not secure exemptions from tax, forcing
the poor to shoulder a disproportionally large burden of support for the
State.159
2. The Dissenting Opinions
In both dissenting opinions, the dissenting justices disagreed with Justice
Wyrick’s reliance on Leveridge as dispositive of the issue. Chief Justice
Combs’ dissent spent considerable time differentiating Leveridge from
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers.160 Those joining in his dissent agreed with
the chief justice that the law implicated in Leveridge was not the product of
a revenue bill because the “principal object was not to raise revenue,” but
rather “to close a loophole that allowed used car dealers to avoid certain
taxation” by, effectively, abusing the system.161 Essentially, the chief justice
believed that the revenue raised from closing that loophole was incidental
to the actual purpose of preventing legal tax evasion that was the source of
drafter error.162 The majority parried this argument by pointing out that
Leveridge was not decided on that issue at all.163 In fact, as discussed
above, the majority almost immediately conceded that prong of the
Anderson test: there is no dispute that the purpose of House Bill 2433 was
to raise revenue, and there was no dispute in Leveridge as to whether the
bill in that case had any purpose other than to raise revenue.164 In both
cases, the decision turned exclusively on whether the bill levied a tax in the
strict sense of the word—the first prong of the test.
Additionally, both Chief Justice Combs and Justice Watt separately
argued that, under State Question 640, Fent v. Fallin stood to recognize not
only that the definition of “revenue bill” had changed, but that Oklahoma
Automobile Dealers presented the opportunity for it to change again.165
Justice Watt pointed out that “the fact that the text of [an] amendment did
158. Id. ¶ 24, 401 P.3d at 1162.
159. Id.
160. Id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1164-65 (Combs, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1165 (Combs, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
162. See id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1164-65 (Combs, C.J., dissenting).
163. Id. ¶ 13, 401 P.3d at 1157.
164. Id. ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1155-56; Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, ¶ 12,
294 P.2d 809, 811 (“The bill under consideration does not within its four corners levy a tax
and for said reason is not per se a revenue bill.”).
165. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1165 (Combs, C.J., dissenting); Id. ¶ 4, 401
P.3d at 1167 (Watt, J., dissenting).
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not specifically change the original language” of the Constitution does not
prevent changes in the definitions of words found in the provisions “in light
of the intent of the voters” that pass those constitutional amendments.166
As the majority opinion pointed out,167 the dissent focused heavily on the
argument that because the bill would force taxpayers to pay more money to
the State, it is automatically a revenue bill within the meaning of the
Oklahoma Constitution, especially in light of State Question 640 and
Fent.168 The dissent further argued that, just as State Question 640 caused
Anderson to be partially overruled, so too should it cause Leveridge to be
overruled.169 The Fent court recognized that State Question 640 was not
meant to restrict the legislature’s ability to amend tax measures that are
already in place unless “such statutory amendments do not ‘raise’ or
increase the tax burden.”170 Justice Watt contended that the primary
purpose of House Bill 2433 was “to reach into the people’s pockets” to
support the government; the bill increases the tax burden on the people and,
therefore, is a revenue bill within the meaning of the Constitution.171 To
hold as the majority did, according to the dissent, elevated “form over
function.”172
But, although the majority recognized that it would be easy to view the
holding as such, there exists a clear distinction between the “elimination of
a special exemption from an existing tax” and the levy of a brand new
tax.173 As previously discussed, the court chose not to overrule Leveridge
because of the “unmistakable constitutional policy disfavoring special
exemptions.”174 State Question 640 did not convince the majority that it
should ignore that policy, even if it would result in a higher taxpayer
burden. Although the overarching consideration is whether a bill seeks to
raise revenue, State Question 640 did not completely remove the first prong
of the Anderson test requiring that the bill levy a tax in the strict sense of
the word. So, relying again on that prong, the majority dismissed much of
the dissents’ arguments because they failed to establish that House Bill
2433 actually levied a new tax.
166. Id. ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1169 (Watt, J., dissenting) (citing Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105,
345 P.3d 1113).
167. Id. ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 1158.
168. Id. ¶ 12, 401 P.3d at 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting).
169. Id. ¶ 20, 401 P.3d at 1174 (Watt, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (quoting Fent, ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18).
171. Id.
172. Id. ¶ 15, 401 P.3d at 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting).
173. Id. ¶ 21, 401 P.3d at 1160.
174. Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1161.
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C. Sierra Club v. State and Richardson v. State
Two other cases brought before the Supreme Court were decided under
much of the same analysis as Fent and Leveridge. The first case, Sierra
Club v. State, was a challenge to House Bill 1449 and the “Motor Fuels Tax
Fee.”175 Basing the decision primarily on the reasoning from Naifeh, the
court ruled that House Bill 1449 was a revenue bill that was enacted
unconstitutionally.176 Second, attorney and gubernatorial candidate Gary
Richardson brought challenges to House Bill 1449, House Bill 2433, and
House Bill 2348 in Richardson v. State.177 While the constitutionality of
House Bill 1449 and House Bill 2433 was already challenged and resolved
in the previous cases, the court had to consider House Bill 2348, which
“uncouple[d] the standard Oklahoma income tax deduction from” that of
the Internal Revenue Code.178 The court chose not to rule on that issue,
however, because it was, at the time of the challenge, impossible to
accurately predict how the new law would affect revenue for the State.179
1. Sierra Club v. State
The Petitioner in Sierra Club v. State180 was a national environmental
organization that primarily advocated for the “mov[ement] away from . . .
fossil fuels . . . and [moving] toward[s] a clean energy economy.” 181 The
organization brought a challenge to House Bill 1449 that created the
“Motor Fuels Tax Fee,” which was designed to affect drivers of hybrid and
electric cars.182 The purpose of the law was to recoup revenue lost from gas
taxes by charging an annual fee of $100 for electric cars and $30 for
hybrids in lieu of the tax the drivers would have paid on fuel.183 In a 6-3
decision, the court held that House Bill 1449 was a revenue bill within the
meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution and was enacted outside of the
restrictions of article V, section 33.184 In effect, Oklahoma did not
previously tax electric cars, so this tax was a new levy.
175.
694.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 83, ¶¶ 2-3, 405 P.3d 691,
Id. ¶¶ 23, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700.
Richardson v. State, 2017 OK 85, ¶ 1, 406 P.3d 571, 572.
Id. ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572.
Id.
Sierra Club, 2017 OK 83, 405 P.3d 691.
About, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/about (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
Id.
Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700.
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For the most part, the court reiterated much of its decision in Naifeh in
concluding that House Bill 1449 satisfied both prongs of the Anderson test.
However, the court faced the government’s persuasive comparisons to the
“mileage tax cases,” Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Ex parte
Tindall, and Ex parte Sales,185 because these cases raised the question of
whether the purpose of House Bill 1449 was to raise revenue, or whether
that revenue gained was incidental to a more regulatory purpose.186
Oklahoma argued that those cases were dispositive of whether House Bill
1449 was a revenue bill because its principal purpose was to “equaliz[e] the
financial burden of maintaining” the state highways.187 However, the court
differentiated the mileage tax cases by examining the purposes behind their
respective bills. In both Ex parte Tindall and Ex parte Sales, the court ruled
consecutively on the same provision of an act that established a fee for
using the public highways for profit for “common carriers.”188 That fee was
ruled to not be a revenue bill because the primary purpose of the fee was
“to regulate the use of public highways by transportation companies,” and
the fee gave the companies the privilege of that use.189 The fee in Pure Oil
Co. was also only assessed on “commercial enterprises” that use the
highways for profit.190 House Bill 1449, on the other hand, created a fee
that would have been prescribed to potentially all Oklahomans, as long as
they purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle.191
Furthermore, the laws upheld in the “mileage tax cases” were given
specific regulatory purposes, and the revenue raised was incidental to those
purposes.192 In contrast, House Bill 1449 provided very little regulatory
direction of the funds that would be collected by the fee it created.193

185. Id. ¶ 13, 405 P.3d at 697; see also Pure Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK
516, 66 P.2d 1097; Ex parte Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125; Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK
668, 233 P. 186.
186. Sierra Club, ¶ 13, 405 P.3d at 697.
187. Id.
188. Tindall, ¶ 6, 229 P. at 128; see Sales, ¶ 12, 233 P. at 187 (“The facts in the two cases
being identical, and the same questions of law being involved in both cases, the decision in
this case must follow the opinion in the Tindall Case.”).
189. Tindall, ¶¶ 0, 1, 229 P. at 126.
190. Pure Oil Co., ¶ 10, 66 P.2d at 1100.
191. Sierra Club, ¶ 16, 405 P.3d at 697.
192. Id.
193. Id. ¶ 16, 405 P.3d at 697-98. The text of the bill does not impose any new regulatory
restrictions which would use the revenue collected from the law. It merely directs revenue to
be collected from hybrid and electric vehicle owners each year. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg.
Sess. 2-3 (Okla. 2017).
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Although the bill created the “State Highway Construction and
Maintenance Fund,” it only directed “the lessor of Ten Thousand
Dollars . . . and one and one-half percent” of the revenue to any specific
use, namely “the development and maintenance of alternative fuel
corridors.”194 House Bill 1449 satisfied the principal purpose requirement
of revenue bills because the revenue raised was not incidental to a
regulatory purpose; raising revenue was the main concern for the bill.
Following this reasoning, the court concluded that the Motor Fuels Tax
Fee also satisfied the first prong: it levied a tax in the strict sense of the
word.195 Contrasting again with the “mileage tax cases,” the court noted the
“extensive regulations that went along with the fee[s]” in those cases, as
opposed to the distinct lack of regulations in House Bill 1449, “except to
forbid registration of [a] vehicle if the [fee] is not paid.”196 The court
concluded that, because the payment by the taxpayer blends with the
general benefit of supporting governmental functions, it is a tax.197 Much
like the “Smoking Cessation Fee” contested in Naifeh was held to be a tax
instead of a fee, the “Motor Fuels Tax Fee” is also a tax.198 The amount
paid was not in exchange for a specific, statute-apportioned governmental
service, instead it was for the general funding of the state with only a very
small portion of the funds directed to a fund designed to compensate for
damage to public roads.199 Because this fee’s provisions were very similar
to those of the “Smoking Cessation Fee” challenged in Naifeh, the court
held that it passed both prongs of the Anderson test, and it was a revenue
bill within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution.200 Therefore,
because the bill was enacted outside the strictures of article V, section 33, it
was unconstitutional.

194. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017).
195. See Sierra Club, ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 699-700.
196. Id. ¶ 22, 405 P.3d at 699.
197. Id. ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 700.
198. Id. ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 699.
199. Id.; H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017); see also Naifeh v. State ex rel.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 45, 400 P.3d 759, 773 (distinguishing a tax from a fee by
saying a tax is subject to a “reasonable rule of apportionment” so as “to provide public
revenue for the support of the government” (quoting Obusee Co-op Ass’n v. Okla. Wheat
Utilization Research & Mkt. Dev. Comm’n (1964 OK 81, ¶ 8, 391 P.2d 216, 218))).
200. Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700.
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2. Richardson v. State
Gary Richardson brought the final case in the series of 2017 revenue bill
cases decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.201 Petitioner Richardson
challenged House Bills 2433, 1449, and 2348.202 The Supreme Court had
already decided on the constitutionality of both House Bill 2433, in
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, and House Bill 1449, in Sierra Club.203
Therefore, the court did not revisit those bills, nor did Richardson present
any new arguments against them.204
However, the court had not yet considered House Bill 2348.205 In an
effort to freeze the Oklahoma standard tax deduction at the 2017 level, the
Oklahoma legislature enacted House Bill 2348,206 which “uncouples the
standard [state] deduction from the amount allowed by the Internal Revenue
Code.”207 The issue boiled down to whether this was even a justiciable
controversy before the court.208 It proved impossible to discern whether this
enacted law would provide more or less revenue, or make any change at
all.209 The court denied jurisdiction over the challenge to House Bill 2348
because it was not possible to decide whether the enacted law was a
revenue bill within the meaning of article V, section 33.210 As discussed
above, a bill is only a revenue bill if it increases revenue or the tax burden
on the public, as decided in Fent v. Fallin.211 While the previous revenue
bill cases all had estimated tax burden changes, it was unclear at the time of
the decision whether this bill would have any effect.212 Because the bill was
“not ripe for review,” the court was unable to decide the constitutionality of
House Bill 2348 and denied original jurisdiction.213
While House Bill 2348 was implicitly upheld for the time being, a future
challenge is certainly possible now that the effects of House Bill 2348 are
201. See Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, ¶ 0, 406 P.3d 571,
572.
202. Id. ¶ 1, 406 P.3d at 572.
203. See Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, 401
P.3d 1152; Sierra Club, 2017 OK 83, 405 P.3d 691.
204. See Richardson, ¶¶ 2, 4, 406 P.3d at 572.
205. H.R. 2348, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017).
206. Id.
207. Richardson, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572.
208. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573.
209. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 406 P.3d at 572, 573.
210. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573.
211. See discussion supra Section III.D.
212. Richardson, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572.
213. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 406 P.3d at 573.
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known.214 With the Trump Administration’s changes to the Internal
Revenue Code, the standard deduction has greatly increased.215 Had this bill
been struck down as unconstitutional, the Oklahoma standard deduction
would have greatly increased with the federal standard deduction. The
majority in Richardson made it clear that the only reason a review of House
Bill 2348 was not ripe for review was because “it [was] unclear at th[at]
time whether H.B. 2348 w[ould] increase revenue in Oklahoma.”216 This
language strongly suggests that, now that the effects are known, this law is
very susceptible to a constitutional challenge. However, just as House Bill
1449 in Sierra Club was struck down in part due to its broad application to
taxpayers, House Bill 2348 could be struck down because changes to the
standard deduction affect the vast majority of Oklahomans.217 While the
amount of revenue expected to be raised is minimal, only $4.4 million,218
House Bill 2348 would also prevent the massive decrease in revenue that
would come with the increase in the federal standard deduction. It is
therefore likely that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule that the
principal purpose of House Bill 2348 is to raise revenue, thereby satisfying
the second prong of the Anderson test.
Assuming House Bill 2348 does satisfy the second prong, the court in
Richardson would then be faced with deciding whether House Bill 2348
levied a tax in the strict sense of the word, the first prong of the Anderson
test. Just as the court in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers was not persuaded
by the fact that House Bill 2433 would require taxpayers to pay more,219 the
fact that the Richardson bill would prevent taxpayers from enjoying a larger
deduction is not enough for the court to consider the bill a new tax levy.
The Richardson bill is very similar to House Bill 2433 in the sense that both
214. See supra Section IV.D.
215. Compare I.R.S. Pub. 501, 25 tbl.6 (Jan. 2, 2018), with Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10
I.R.B. 396 (Mar. 5, 2018) (doubling the federal standard income tax deduction). Many
federal exemptions have been removed to make up for the difference in the standard
deduction. Oklahoma would have seen a proportional increase in the state standard
deduction without the removal of any tax exemptions. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054, 2072-73 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 63).
216. Richardson, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573 (emphasis omitted).
217. See infra Part V.C.
218. Associated Press, Oklahoma House Passes Standard Deduction Revenue Measure,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 2, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/oklahoma/articles/2017-05-02/oklahoma-house-passes-standard-deduction-revenuemeasure (citing Republican Representative Louis Moore, the bill drafter).
219. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 17,
401 P.3d 152, 1158.
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bills sought to change only a part of a previously enacted tax benefit.220
Because the Richardson court ruled that a partial removal of a tax
exemption did not levy a tax in the strict sense of the word, it seems
unlikely that simply changing the relationship of a state deduction to the
equivalent federal deduction would levy a tax, either.
V. How the Oklahoma Legislature Can Raise Money
The cases discussed above serve as the most up-to-date guidelines for the
Oklahoma legislature when drafting new legislation to raise revenue and
increase the tax burden. This section outlines the implications of each 2017
Supreme Court case and provides some reasonable inferences that can be
gleaned from those decisions.
A. Raising Revenue for Specific Purposes
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion in Naifeh outlined many
important considerations for the Oklahoma legislature when authoring bills
that are either regulatory in nature and contain a fee provision or are purely
a tax increase. In light of the continuing deficit crisis after Senate Bill 845’s
invalidation, the guidelines provided by Naifeh must be closely adhered to
for future legislative sessions.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that if the legislature is going to
provide a regulatory purpose in new legislation, the revenue received from
the bill in question must substantially go toward fulfilling that purpose.221
The revenue raised from the bill must be merely incidental to the true
purpose of the bill.222 The legislature can provide any purpose in the bill,
but it is not dispositive of the issue.223 The purpose should not only be
written into the bill, but should also be reflected in the enactment of the
legislation by explaining how revenue will be collected and why it is being
collected. Because the fee in Naifeh was not allocated directly to a
government agency to confer a benefit to the taxpayer, it could not be said
to have a regulatory purpose.224 It simply provided a way to increase the tax
burden to cover Oklahoma’s budget deficit. Although “contextual
evidence” can be extremely important in evaluating the revenue-raising
potential of new legislation, it is possible that the text, on its own, can
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See generally H.R. 2348, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 34, 400 P.3d 759, 769.
Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 400 P.3d at 768-69.
See id. ¶ 32, 400 P.3d at 768-69.
See id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771.
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establish the “primary operation and effect” of raising revenue to support
the state.225
That said, even if legislation provides a sufficiently regulatory purpose,
the amount of money raised for a claimed purpose in relation to the total
expected revenue from a bill will now represent another important factor, as
will the total expected revenue itself.226 According to Justice Wyrick, “a
quarter-of-a-billion dollars per year is hardly ‘incidental’” even if the aim is
“designed to reduce smoking.”227 While this amount is possibly dispositive
on its own, it is compounded by the fact that only an insignificant 0.5% of
the revenue would actually go towards preventing and reducing smoking. 228
It remains unclear just how far the estimated $1 million would have gone in
achieving this result throughout the entire state of Oklahoma, but it was
certainly not far enough to convince the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the
generic cigarette tax was a simple regulatory “fee,” especially given how
much excess revenue the bill provided. The court may have been satisfied
with the “regulatory purpose” arguments had a much more substantial
portion of the revenue gone to the claimed purpose. While the estimated
minimum fraction of future revenue that would satisfy a regulatory purpose
is far from certain, the legislature was nowhere close in the Smoking
Cessation and Prevention Act.
The government also argued that a “sin tax could never be a ‘revenue
raising measure’ because such a tax is always imposed” to regulate the
behavior it is taxing—but the court disagreed.229 Because the revenue
raising “is itself the ‘regulatory device,’” the principal purpose is to raise
revenue.230 For this reason, virtually all “sin taxes” constitute revenue bills
within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution.231 The primary purpose
of a “sin tax”232 is to “reach into the people’s pockets,” undoubtedly the
principal purpose behind Senate Bill 845—“the single largest source of . . .
revenue” that the legislature drafted during the 2017 Session.233

225. Id. ¶ 22, 400 P.3d at 766.
226. See id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770.
227. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 769-70.
228. Id. ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767.
229. Id. ¶ 35 & n.55, 400 P.3d at 770 & n.55.
230. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 770.
231. See id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770 (describing cigarette taxes as “regulatory tool[s]” and
“sin tax[es]”).
232. Sin Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sin tax” as “[a]n
excise tax”).
233. Naifeh, ¶ 37, 400 P.3d at 770.
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Moreover, Justice Wyrick explained another legislative consideration
when making a regulatory bill: flexibility of the provisions. The drafters of
Senate Bill 845 attempted to create a regulatory scheme by prohibiting the
use of tobacco on state-owned property, directing certain organizations to
“work together” to combat specific smoking-related issues, and adding a
“conspicuous sign[]” requirement for areas which already prohibit
smoking.234 In fact, one provision directed owners of public places to
simply “[a]sk smokers to refrain from smoking.”235 Justice Wyrick ruled
that these kinds of provisions were simply too vague and flexible to be
considered truly “regulatory.”236 In fact, some of these provisions, as it
turns out, simply codified policies already in place: Section 5 of the bill
codified Governor Fallin’s executive order prohibiting smoking on stateowned property.237 None of these provisions utilized the revenue derived
from the fee, and some would not even be controlled functions of the state.
The provisions hewed closer to guidelines or suggestions than regulatory
laws that require adherence. Requiring owners of certain businesses to
place anti-smoking signs and tell smokers to leave their premises simply
does not require $200 million from the state budget. To be truly
“regulatory,” a bill will not only have to explicitly state how those subject
to the provisions can comply but might also need to explain how the money
raised will be used. If the legislature wants to transform a revenue bill into a
regulatory bill, the regulatory measures cannot be nearly as malleable as
those set forth in the Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act, especially if it
is one which would generate significant state income.
The final important consideration the legislature must make when
following Naifeh is where it allocates the generated revenue. There must be
“a direct nexus between the fee and the government service” that the fee
supports.238 In Naifeh, the fee was intended to support a fund designed to
reduce smoking in Oklahoma, and the written purpose in section 1 of the
bill attempts to effectuate this. But upon scrutinizing the bill, one can see
that it hardly allocated any revenue to that purpose or directed any agencies
to require any specific activity to accomplish it. The fee, as paid by
wholesalers when they purchase cigarettes for their own profit, would not
be paid by a taxpayer that received any direct benefit of services being
234. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess., at 2 (Okla. 2017).
235. Id.
236. Naifeh, ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767.
237. See Exec. Order 2012-01 (as enacted by Gov. Mary Fallin Feb. 6, 2012),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/829.pdf.
238. Naifeh, ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771.
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created by Senate Bill 845.239 Instead, all but $1 million went directly to the
state treasury for the “Health Care Enhancement Fund” that does not have
any smoking-related strictures attached to it.240
In one final attempt by the State to argue for a meek regulatory purpose,
Sierra Club v. State instead reiterated much of what was decided in Naifeh.
The State argued that the true purpose of the Motor Fuels Tax Fee was to
recoup gas tax losses from taxpayers switching to electric and hybrid
vehicles.241 Unfortunately, just as Senate Bill 845 in Naifeh did not actually
describe in any real detail how the funds would be used for the stated
purpose of the legislation, the text of the Motor Fuels Tax Fee did not
provide any helpful insight into the revenue it would produce. In fact,
House Bill 1449 was in an even worse position than Senate Bill 845
because it contained no stated purpose in the text of the bill that would have
supported the state’s contention.242 This exemplifies the importance of the
stated purpose of a bill. If the claimed purpose of a bill is regulatory in
nature, then the drafters must discuss exactly where the revenue will go. It
is much more likely that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not subject a
bill to article V, section 33 if the drafters of the bill include a well-defined
regulatory purpose and provisions effectuating that purpose.
In both Naifeh and Sierra Club, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated
the holding in Fent: the principal concern when deciding if a bill is a
“revenue bill” under the Oklahoma Constitution is whether the principal
purpose is raising revenue. Until Fent, revenue “raising” was less
important. The court in Fent, and now in Naifeh and beyond, recognized the
intention of the people in enacting State Question 640—no new taxes
without a vote of the people.
B. Removing Exemptions from Previously Levied Taxes
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers illustrates plainly that the first prong of
the Anderson test requiring that a bill levy a tax in the strict sense of the
word not only remains an important consideration but can be dispositive in
deciding that a bill does not qualify as a “revenue bill” under the Oklahoma
Constitution. Because the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not eliminate this
factor, the court upheld Leveridge with its holding. Basically, bills that seek
239. Id. (“[T]he . . . assessment is actually assessed against the seller of cigarettes, whom
no one argues will make use of any government-provided health services.”).
240. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017).
241. Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 83, ¶¶ 10, 13, 405 P.3d
691, 695-96, 697.
242. Id. ¶ 11, 405 P.3d at 696.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

526

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:497

to remove tax exemptions are not revenue bills within the meaning of
article V, section 33.
Although the principal purpose of the removal of a tax exemption is to
raise revenue, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Anderson test,
removing a tax exemption does not levy a new tax in the strict sense of the
word. The court pointed out that the exemption the legislature sought to
remove via the bill in question in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers was put in
place eighty-two years before this decision for a tax that had already been
levied two years before that.243 While the original enactment of the sales tax
was subject to the strictures of article V, section 33, the removal of an
exemption of that tax is not. The court made it clear that removing an
exemption inherently means that the tax has already been levied.244 While
the original tax would obviously be subject to article V, section 33,
removing an exemption of that tax does not equate to a brand-new levy.
This poses the question of whether the holding is limited to exemptions.
Besides all the possibilities of partially or fully removing tax exemptions,
there are also many tax deductions and credits that the legislature can
increase, decrease, eliminate, or enact. If the legislature drafts a bill
reducing or removing a tax deduction or credit, the bill would
unquestionably have the principal object of raising revenue, satisfying the
second prong of the Anderson test. It would be an obvious way of
preventing the people from enjoying all or part of a process to lower their
tax bill. Although nothing is certain until the issue comes before the
Supreme Court, it seems likely that the reduction or removal of a tax
deduction or credit would not satisfy the first prong of the Anderson test
because, under Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, it would not levy a new tax
in the strict sense of the word.245
While there is no narrow tax imposed on only a specific set of taxpayers
like the one in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, tax deductions and credits
act against the original tax imposed in the Oklahoma tax code.246 The
function of a tax deduction is effectuated by decreasing the taxable income
before taxes are ultimately imposed. Just as the removal of an exemption
from an already levied tax did not constitute a newly levied tax, the removal
of a deduction from pretax income would not likely constitute a newly
levied tax. In a similar vein, tax credits are enjoyed only in specific
243. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 15,
401 P.3d 1152, 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting).
244. Id. ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153.
245. See id. ¶ 20, 401 P.3d at 1160.
246. See generally 68 OKLA. STAT. § 2355 (2011).
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circumstances for certain taxpayers by decreasing the calculated tax owed
by a specific amount. Eliminating a tax credit is akin to the removal of an
exemption because it would not force the taxpayer to pay any new tax.
Instead, it would simply dispose of the ability of that taxpayer to lower the
amount they owe because of their circumstances.
C. Targeting Legislation at Smaller Groups of Taxpayers
Finally, through a very important contrast to the mileage tax cases, the
court in Sierra Club suggested that the more taxpayers a revenue-raising
bill affects, the more likely the court will subject the bill to the requirements
of article V, section 33. As discussed above, Ex parte Tindall, Ex parte
Sales, and Pure Oil Co. were all examples of legislation that was upheld
despite an increase in the tax burden for some taxpayers.247 The enacted
fees in the mileage tax cases were imposed only on taxpayers that were
considered transportation companies using the public highways for their
own profit. The government in Sierra Club compared those fees to the
Motor Fuels Tax Fee to show it was fully regulatory in nature. However,
the court distinguished the Motor Fuels Tax Fee because, unlike those in
the mileage tax cases, the fee in Sierra Club would have been imposed on
any taxpayer that opted to purchase a hybrid or electric vehicle. This
reasoning demonstrates that the court looks not only at the amount of
revenue that the legislature estimates they can collect from a bill, but also at
the width of the net the bill casts on the public. The more potential payors
on whom the bill imposes the fee, the more likely the legislation will be
deemed a revenue bill creating a new tax instead of a regulatory fee.
VI. Conclusion
To the extent the Oklahoma legislature wants to use taxes to close the
deficit, the drafters must be able to create revenue-raising bills that raise
revenue in a constitutionally permissible manner. Because it is so difficult
to satisfy article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution, it is
imperative that the legislature drafts bills to avoid it when they can.248 Such
tailoring could possibly include removing some exemptions, deductions, or
credits. Revenue-raising legislation likely cannot include any kind of fee
247. See generally Pure Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK 516, 66 P.2d 1097; Ex
parte Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125; Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK 668, 233 P. 186.
248. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 33. In an historic moment for the state, the Oklahoma
legislature reached the supermajority requirement for the first time since the passage of State
Question 640 when they passed House Bill 1010 on March 26, 2018. H.R. 1010, 56th Leg.,
2nd Spec. Sess. (Okla. 2018); see also State Question 640, What’s That?, supra note 79.
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that seeks to affect a large portion of the population, unless that fee has a
written regulatory purpose that goes beyond merely raising money for the
state. No matter how the Oklahoma legislature chooses to raise the needed
money, if the supermajority requirement is too stringent, and a vote of the
people forced to pay the imposed taxes too unlikely, then the legislature
will have to find a different way to comply with the Oklahoma
Constitution.
Paul Anthony Tortorici
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